MAKING THE WORLD SAFE FOR DESPOTISM

THE LONG-EXILED MONARCHS of Europe, once they had been restored to the thrones overturned by Napoleon, banded together to stamp out the dangerous democratic embers kindled by the French Revolution. In 1815 the Czar of Russia, Alexander I, devised a visionary pact known as the Holy Alliance, which he persuaded most of the sovereigns of Continental Europe to accept. This mystical union was not, properly speaking, used by these monarchs to carry out their reactionary policies. The effective military combination was the Quadruple Alliance, formed in 1815 and containing Russia, Austria, Prussia, and England. It was followed in 1818 by the Quintuple Alliance, to which France, now restored to her monarchical ways was admitted. To avoid confusion, the term Holy Alliance will be used here, as contemporaries used it, to refer to the concert of European powers.

The fears of the re-throned despots were by no means groundless. In 1820 and 1821 a veritable rash of revolutions broke out in Spain, Portugal, Naples, and Greece. The alarmed monarchs hastened to launch repressive measures, and in 1821 Austria crushed the Italian uprisings with ferocity and dispatch. In the spring of 1823 a French army invaded Spain, and by October succeeded in restoring the depraved and vengeful Ferdinand VII to his throne. The powers then discussed plans for summoning a Paris congress which, it was rumored, would send a powerful Franco Spanish force to the Americas to crush the new crop of republics.

Great Britain viewed with increasing dissatisfaction the savage suppression of the rebellions in Italy and Spain, and gradually parted company with her European allies. Not only were there liberal stirrings in England, but the Ministry was alarmed by the shift in the balance of power that would result from French influence in Spain. Vastly more important were the lucrative markets of South America, once closed by Spanish monopoly, but now opened by the revolutionists to English merchants. A restoration of Spanish despotism would undoubtedly mean an abrupt cessation of this trade. The powerful British commercial groups, their appetites already whetted, were determined at all costs to prevent such a misfortune.

MONARCHY MENACES THE AMERICAS

The American people were by no means indifferent witnesses of these fateful events. At first the Holy Alliance seems to have caused little anxiety, though as early as 1816 the editor of Niles' Weekly Register (Baltimore) declared that it was only a mask "to blind the misguided multitude." But by mid-1821, after the powers had mopped up in
Italy, America was thoroughly aroused. The Russian minister refused to attend a Fourth of July banquet because as he reported, "some one would be sure to attack the Holy Alliance." "The Holy Alliance and the Devil," ran a contemporary American toast:: "May the friends of liberty check their career, and compel them to dissolve partnership."

Many apprehensive Americans began to entertain wider fears. They suspected that the forces of reaction, after having trampled on the last vestiges of liberty in Europe, would next turn to the Spanish-American republics. But would the despots be content to stop there? Why not, while they were at it, wipe out the original hotbed of democracy, which had propagated so many of their recent woes? Even if these powers did not attack America directly, they might secure Spanish-American territory and erect powerful monarchical establishments dangerously near the vitals of the United States. In the spring of 1823 the rumor was current that France would receive Cuba as a reward for assisting Spain to regain her wayward dominions.

Anxiety over the schemes of the European powers quickly spread to Washington. On November 13, 1823, following a gloomy Cabinet meeting, Secretary of State John Q. Adams wrote that Secretary of War John C. Calhoun was "perfectly moonstruck" by the success of the French invasion of Spain. As for President Monroe,

I [Adams] find him…alarmed, far beyond anything that I could have conceived possible, with the fear that the Holy Alliance[European powers] are about to restore immediately all South America to Spain. Calhoun stimulates the panic, and the news that Cadiz [Spain] has surrendered to the French has so affected the President that he appeared entirely to despair the cause of South America.

Even Secretary Adams, who was less inclined to take an alarmist view than his colleagues, wrote, as late as November 25, 1823, that the challenge of the Alliance "is, and has been, to me a fearful question."

THE SOUTHWARD PUSH OF THE RUSSIAN BEAR

Czarist Russia also darkened the diplomatic picture on the northwest coast of North America. Late in the 18th Century and early in the 19th adventuresome Russian traders had not only established posts in what is now Alaska but had pushed down into Spanish California. In 1812 they constructed rough-hewn Fort Ross, north of San Francisco and near the mouth of the present Russian River. At the same time American fur traders--"Boston men"--had been sailing along the Alaskan coast, where they had debauched the Indians with alcohol.
Annoyed by these foreign intrusions, the Czar issued an imperial proclamation, in September, 1821, warning foreign vessels not to come within one hundred Italian miles of the coast of Russian America (Alaska) north of the 51st parallel. This edict was not only an indefensible assertion of sovereignty over the high seas, but it seemed to indicate that Russia was prepared to push the southern boundary of what is now Alaska deep into the Oregon country---an area which both Great Britain and the United States then claimed jointly.

The Russian proclamation, surprisingly enough, did not cause widespread alarm in the United States. The Pacific Northwest was far away; plenty of land remained nearer home; the few American traders thus affected were not important; and the real Russian menace seemed to lie in the Czar's leadership of the Holy Alliance. The editor of Niles' Weekly Register, though ultimately expressing some concern, remarked somewhat casually that "even if the emperor of Russia should make good his claim to the 51st degree, we guess that there will be a region of the country large enough left for us." A rhymester, writing some months later in the same journal, was inclined to poke fun at the Czar's proclamation:

Old Neptune one morning was seen on the rocks,
Shedding tears by the pailful, and tearing his locks;
He cried, a Land Lubber has stole, on this day,
Full four thousand miles of my ocean away;
He swallows the earth, (he exclaimed with emotion),
And then, to quench appetite, slap goes the ocean:
Brother Jove must look out for his skies, let me tell ye,
Or the Russian will bury them all in his belly.
American public opinion may have been apathetic, but the Washington authorities could not let the Russian challenge stand. The United States, as well as Great Britain, lodged vigorous protests. Secretary Adams' blunt warning to the Russian minister in Washington was pregnant with meaning:

I told him specially that we should contest the right of Russia to cry territorial establishment on this continent, and that we should assume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for any new European colonial establishments.

One finds here, almost word for word, the noncolonization principle that emerged in the Monroe Doctrine some four months later.

**GANNING'S FLATTERING PROPOSITION**

George Canning—a brilliant orator and caustic wit—brought a new outlook to the British Ministry when, in September, 1822, he became Foreign Secretary. A wily and gifted diplomatist, he was said to have been unable to drink a cup of tea without a stratagem. In August, 1823, he proposed to Richard Rush, United States Minister in London, that America join with Britain in a manifesto designed to prevent possible intervention by the European powers in the New World. The clever Briton was evidently planning a stroke in Spain's colonies that would regain the prestige that he had lost by his inability to prevent the French invasion of Spain's homeland. Later, after President Monroe had stolen his thunder, he extravagantly boasted, "I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old." He thus claimed to have saved Spanish America, though not Spain, from despotism.

Even though the Monroe administration had for several years been seeking an understanding with London to safeguard the new Latin-American republics, Rush was without instructions to accept what amounted to an informal alliance with the Mother Country. But in line with previous American overtures, he hinted that the British proposal might prove acceptable if Canning, would consent to recognize the Spanish-American republics—a step that powerful conservative forces in England were blocking. Upon Canning's unwillingness to rise to the bait, Rush referred the momentous issue home.

President Monroe's first reaction was rather favorable, but before making so crucial a decision, he consulted his two predecessors in the White House. The seventy-two-year old Madison and the eighty-year-old Jefferson, both of whom had once been anti-British, forthwith advised cooperation with Britain. Madison even went so far as also to urge a declaration in favor of Greek freedom.

Two years earlier, in 1821, the Greeks had revolted against Turkish tyranny. The enthusiasm for their cause which speedily sprang up in America had numerous roots. The Greeks were imitating America's revolutionary blow for liberty; they were challenging the despotic policies of the Holy Alliance; they were Christians battling against Moslem infidels; and they were the "classical creditors" of Western Civilization. The so-called "Greek fever" was further heightened by atrocity stories: the Turks reputedly collected bushels of Greek ears. Pro-Greek enthusiasm also took the form of sermons, orations, balls, mass meetings, poems, resolutions in Congress, and the solicitation of funds. Yale
college students alone contributed $500.

**ADAMS GOES IT ALONE**

The cool-headed Secretary of State Adams was not swayed by the Greek fever or the pro-British advice of the two ex-Presidents. Intensely nationalistic and individualistic, he viewed with deep suspicion Britons bearing gifts. No blind isolationist, he was not so much opposed to associating with Britain as he was to associating under conditions in which Canning would assume the leadership and England would get the credit in Latin America, commercially and otherwise. "It would be more candid," Adams insisted in Cabinet meeting, "as well as more dignified, to avow our principles explicitly to Russia and France, than to come in as a cock-boat in the wake of the British man-of-war."

Ever vigilant, Adams had other grounds for misgivings. Lurking in the Canning scheme was the suggestion that neither the United States nor Great Britain would seize any part of Spanish America. Such a pledge would tie the hands of the American people should they ever want, as they ultimately did, Texas, California, and Cuba. Canning, who was particularly nervous about the fate of Cuba, appears to have had in mind erecting a barrier against the southward surge of the Yankees. But Secretary Adams, who feared a self-denying trap, expressed his opposition forcibly and convincingly in a Cabinet meeting.

Adams also reasoned that the danger of armed intervention in Latin America by one or more of the European powers was not imminent. Although some dispute continues among historians as to a real peril, none of the powers of the Quadruple Alliance had apparently worked out a definite policy of intervention. Adams, to be sure, did not have the secret documents before him, but his ability to piece together isolated bits and make a shrewd deduction is a tribute to his statesmanship. The United States was not prepared to fight, but neither, he suspected, were the Allied powers. They did not have enough at stake. The astute Adams could therefore scoff at Calhoun's fears of intervention when he said, "...I no more believe that the Holy Allies will restore the Spanish dominion upon the American continent than that the Chimborazo [Ecuadorian peak 20,702 feet high] will sink beneath the ocean."

Adams likewise surmised--also without full knowledge--that even if the European powers attempted to intervene, the all-powerful British navy would prevent them. The new Spanish-American markets simply had to be kept open. So whatever the Washington government did or failed to do, there would presumably be no intervention. Sheltered behind Britain's "stout wooden walls," President Monroe could safely blow a "republican blast" of defiance at all Europe. Again the discords of the European powers--their diplomatic distresses--made possible a redletter success in American foreign policy.

**A CLOSED SEASON ON COLONIZATION**

Once Adams had carried the day for his lone-wolf course, he had to grapple with the problem of how to proclaim it to the world. His suggestion that the new policy be communicated to the European foreign offices through sharp diplomatic notes did not find favor. Instead, President Monroe hit upon the scheme of launching his pronouncement as a part of his regular message to Congress. He evidently did not regard
this step as a rejection of Canning's overture, but as a stop-gap warning to the Allied
powers while the State Department continued its efforts to work out an acceptable joint
manifesto with London.

Monroe laid the first draft of his memorable message before his Cabinet on
November 21, 1823. It was bold, even defiant, in tone. Adams immediately expressed
alarm, particularly over the proposal to champion the Greek revolutionists. "The ground
that I wish to take," he explained the next day, "is that of earnest remonstrance against the
interference of the European powers by force with South America, but to disclaim all
interference on our part with Europe; to make an American cause, and adhere inflexibly
to that."

Monroe was at first reluctant to accept Adams' clear-cut concept of the two
hemispheres. But he finally concluded that meddlesome interference in the affairs of
Europe would weaken his hand. He therefore changed his stirring declaration in behalf of
the Greeks to a pious wish for their success, and watered down his proposed reproof of
France for invading Spain.

The now famous Monroe Doctrine was embedded in the President's regular
annual message to Congress, on December 2, 1823. It consisted of two widely separated
passages, comprising about two printed pages out of a total of thirteen. After some
preliminary remarks, Monroe alluded to the negotiations with Russia over the Northwest
coast:

In the discussion ... the occasion has been judged proper for asserting that
the American continents, by the free and independent condition which
they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as
subjects for future colonization by any European powers.

Monroe thus enunciated, rather incidentally, the highly significant noncolonization
principle. His failure to make more of it was probably a result of his knowledge that the
so-called Russian menace in the Northwest was not threatening, and that negotiations
were proceeding smoothly regarding the Czar's [proclamation] of 1821.

MONROE LECTURES THE POWERS

The remainder of the Monroe Doctrine appeared after an interval of seven pages which
the President devoted principally to domestic affairs. The most striking passages were
inspired by the rumored intervention in America of the so-called Holy Alliance. [non-
intervention principle]

The political [monarchical] system of the allied powers is essentially
different... from that of America.... We owe it, therefore, to candor and to
the amicable relations existing between the United States and those
powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to
extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to
our peace and safety.

Monroe then served notice:
With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered [Florida?] and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence ... we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.

Monroe concluded with a ringing restatement of the doctrine of the two hemispheres.[non-entanglement principle] "Our policy in regard to Europe," he said, "which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers...." In short, the United States would refrain from intervention in embroilments like the Greek war for independence. In return for this hollow act of self-denial, Europe would be expected to keep its hands off the Latin-American wars for independence.

Monroe's basic ideas, grounded as they were on security and self-defense, were neither novel nor original. A possible exception would be the implication, here officially voiced for the first time, that the United States would fight to defend the Spanish-American republics. But this commitment in turn was inspired by self-defense. The essential ideas of the Monroe Doctrine go back deep into the colonial period, and they had been repeatedly foreshadowed, if not definitely formulated, by George Washington, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson and other Founding Fathers. Monroe, so to speak, merely codified existing ideas like those of the two hemispheres, no transfer of territory, nonintervention, and nonentanglement. The President was ably assisted by John Quincy Adams, who contributed so much to the formulation of the Doctrine, especially the noncolonization dictum, that he has often been referred to as its real author. Actually, the credit should be about equally divided between the two men.

THE COMMENDATION OF MONROE

The American people on the whole responded favorably to Monroe's manifesto. The commercial world was especially gratified by this assurance that the Spanish-American markets would not be slammed shut. More than that, the doctrine was intoxicating to the national spirit. The upstart young republic, the strongest independent power in America, had hurled defiance into the teeth of a despotic Europe. Nothing could better illustrate the rising tide of nationalism. Speaking from a capital burned by the British invader only nine years before, and backed by only a tiny army and navy, the American government was proclaiming its ability to repulse the European allies should they challenge Monroe's pretensions. "If the Holy Alliance [Quadruple Alliance] attempt to control the destinies of South America," remarked the Boston Centinel, "they will find not only a [British] lion, but an [American] eagle in the way."

The American press, which had feared European intervention, teemed with self-confident, exulting words of praise. The Eastern Argus (Portland, Maine) observed that Monroe's message "has been received throughout the country with a warm and universal burst of applause." One Congressman remarked that the new doctrine was "as wise as it was magnanimous." At least two state legislatures passed commendatory resolutions. Perhaps the most trustworthy general observation was that of the British charge in
Washington:

The President's message... seems to have been received with acclamation throughout the United States.... The explicit and manly tone... has evidently found in every bosom a chord which vibrates in strict unison with the sentiments so conveyed. They have been echoed from one end of the Union to the other. It would, indeed, be difficult, in a country composed of elements so various ... to find more perfect unanimity than has been displayed on every side...

But the United States, preoccupied with internal problems, was probably not so enthusiastic or unanimous as described. Here and there a dissenting voice was raised. One member of Congress found the pronouncement "rash and inconsiderate"; another "an unauthorized, unmeaning and empty menace, well calculated to excite the angry passions and embroil us with foreign nations." The Richmond Enquirer wanted evidence of a real danger of intervention, while a writer in the Boston Advertiser demanded: "Is there anything in the Constitution which makes our Government the Guarantors of the Liberties of the World? of the Wahabees? the Peruvians? the Chilese? the Mexicans or Colombians?" But such criticisms were generally drowned in the widespread chorus of approval.

STEALING A MARCH ON CANNING

Public opinion in England at first reacted favorably to the "bold" American message, for Englishmen were quite content to let Monroe help pull their South-American chestnuts out of the fire. An immediate rise in Spanish-American securities reflected British appreciation of American support. The influential London Times applauded "the resolute policy of the United States, and interpreted the new doctrine to mean that intervention in the Americas by the Holy Alliance would be "a just cause of war" "With what satisfaction," continued the Times, "... must we receive the tidings, when they announce the intended prosecution of a policy so directly British!" Britons apparently did not realize, at least at the time, that the noncolonization clause was as applicable to England as to Russia.

But Canning labored under no illusions. Annoyed because the United States had stolen his thunder and was currying favor with the Latin Americans, he perceived that the noncolonization principle could be invoked against his own country as well as against Continental Europe. The Monroe administration may indeed have had Britain's alleged designs on Cuba specifically in mind.

The attitude of Canning toward the Monroe Doctrine was based partly on his positive knowledge that the European allies would make no hostile movement. After waiting briefly for something to come of his overtures to Rush, he had taken matters into his own hands. He was confident that the French army would be used in the event of intervention, as it had been in Spain, and that Russia would not embark upon such an enterprise alone. Canning therefore brought strong pressure to bear upon Prince de Polignac, the French Ambassador in London. As a consequence, the latter signed a memorandum, on October 9, 1823, formally disclaiming any intention on the part of France to invade Spanish America. Thus, nearly two months before Monroe's famous
message to Congress, the British Foreign Office, without Monroe's knowledge, removed
the most serious remaining threat to Latin-American liberties.

Canning was not at all secretive about his intervention. Weeks before Monroe's
message reached Europe, the substance of the Polignac memorandum was known in
Austria, Russia, and France, and even by Minister Rush. In March, 1824, Canning
published this document. He wanted the world to know that the might of Britain's fleet,
and not the bombast of President Monroe, had given the death blow to any possible
schemes of the European allies.

THE INDIGNATION OF THE DESPOTS

In Continental Europe the aristocrats, who viewed the Monroe message with
mingled annoyance and contempt, gave vent to such epithets as "haughty," "arrogant,"
"blustering," and "monstrous." The principle of "America for the Americans" came as a
shock to nations which for centuries had looked upon the Western Hemisphere as their
own private hunting grounds. If the monarchs had been prepared to intervene, their first
reaction probably would have been to do so just to put the upstart Yankee in his place.
In Austria, a ringleader of reaction, Chancellor Metternich denounced the "indecent
declarations" of Monroe, while his colleague, the councilor of state, was startled by the
presumption of "that new transatlantic colossus." The French minister of foreign affairs
spoke jeeringly of the gulf between American pretensions and American naval power,
and L Etoile (Paris) responded tartly:

Mr. Monroe, who is not a sovereign has assumed in his message the tone
of a powerful monarch, whose armies and fleets are ready to march at the
first signal .... Mr. Monroe is the temporary President of a Republic
situated on the east coast of North America This republic is bounded
on the south by the possessions of the King of Spin, and on the north by
those of the King of England. Its independence was only recognized forty
years ago; by what right then would the two Americas today be under its
immediate sway from Hudson's Bay to Cape Hom?

The Russian government, though annoyed, could not have been greatly surprised
by the Monroe Doctrine. During the preceding weeks Secretary Adams had presented
even sharper warnings to the Russian minister in Washington. But the Czar was not
frightened by the Yankee blast. Of all the European monarchs he most warmly
sympathized with Spain's aspirations for the recovery of her lost domains; and with
France eliminated by the Polignac pledge, he was the one most likely to embark upon an
intervention. Early in 1824 he appears to have given some thought to doing so. But,
lacking assistance from the other powers, he soon abandoned any such plans. The British
navy could not be laughed aside.

In 1824, four and a half months after the birth of the Monroe Doctrine, Secretary
Adams negotiated a treaty by which Russia agreed to retreat up the Northwest coast from
51 ° [parallel]to 54' 40'--the present southernmost tip of Alaska. This withdrawal,
reinforced by an Anglo-Russian treaty the next year, neatly solved the problem raised by
the [proclamation] of 1821. Some observers have concluded that the Czar, alarmed by
Monroe's blunt warning, was browbeaten into this surrender. But scholars now know that
even before Monroe posted his no-trespassing sign, the Russian regime, preoccupied at home and gorged with territory in Asia, had decided to pull in its horns on the American coast. The terms that the Czar granted to the United States, despite the annoying message of Monroe, merely represented a predetermined policy.

THE DISILLUSIONMENT OF LATIN AMERICA

The American people are prone to believe that the infant republics to the south were duly grateful for their rescue from the European allies by chivalrous Uncle Sam. Present knowledge of popular reactions in Spanish America is fragmentary, but in some quarters the message was greeted with rejoicing, in others with indifference, and in still others with dissatisfaction—on the whole with no more than tepid enthusiasm. Simon Bolivar, the George Washington of the recent revolutions, apparently did not regard Monroe's pronouncement as of world-shaking importance.

The United States in any event did not elbow aside its arch rival, Great Britain, as the moral and commercial leader of South America. Shortly after Monroe sent his message to Congress, the Polignac memorandum was published throughout Spanish America. The newly hatched republics speedily recognized that they had been saved from the European powers not by the paper shield of Monroe but by the oaken fleets of Britain. The leaders of Latin America also perceived that the new Monrovian policy was essentially selfish. The United States had naturally been thinking first of its own safety, and only secondarily of its neighbors.

Three of the new Latin-American republics applied to Washington for assistance, while two others, Colombia and Brazil, interpreted Monroe's message as an invitation to form an alliance against European aggression. But Secretary Adams, restrained by the traditional policy of nonentanglement, did not grasp the hands so eagerly outstretched below the border. He made it clear that the United States would not act unless there was a general European intervention and unless the British navy stood athwart the invaders. Monroe had, in short, created false hopes that he was forced to disappoint. All this did nothing to diminish the role of the British navy or to transform the cautious Yankee into a dashing Sir Galahad.

MYTHS ABOUT THE MONROE DOCTRINE

What came to be known as the Monroe Doctrine was not law, national or international, although repeated attempts were made in Congress to legalize it. It was merely a simple, unilateral, Presidential statement of foreign policy. Adams even spoke of it as a "lecture" to the powers. It did not commit subsequent administrations to any definite course. As Lord Clarendon politely remarked in the 1850's, "The Monroe Doctrine is merely the dictum of its distinguished author." He might have added, no less pointedly, that it was no stronger than the power of the United States to eject the trespasser—no bigger than America's armed forces.

The new dogma did not even need a distinguishing name. It might just as well have been called the Long-Range Self-Defense Doctrine—for that is essentially what it was. Monroe warned the European allies to keep out of Latin America, and Russia to forego further colonization, primarily because he felt that their presence would be
dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States. If, at a later date, the powers should again menace the Americas, all that the State Department had to do was to base its protests on self-defense, without having to drag in Monroe's name. Yet Monroe gave definite form, as well as a global emphasis, to a fundamental foreign policy. When his successors later had to invoke the Doctrine, it carried greater weight with the American people because it had an "aura of antiquity" and because it was associated with a big name.

One question remains unanswered: Did the Monroe Doctrine prevent the dismemberment of Latin America? Even if one grants that the European allies had no concrete plans for coming, they could easily have worked them out in later months. Were they frightened away by the wide publicity given to the Monroe Doctrine? One common answer is to point to the fact that there is now vastly less European territory in the Americas than in 1823, whereas European land-grabbers after 1823 absorbed nearly all of Africa and much of Asia.

This geographical comparison must be used with caution. With the passage of time the larger republics of Latin America, protected in part by distance, were capable of putting up a stiff resistance. The European powers, moreover, established profitable commercial and financial relationships with Latin America without the need of physical conquest. Finally, during most of the 19th century the European imperialists were too deeply preoccupied with difficulties and designs elsewhere, including the easier and richer pickings of Asia and Africa, to give much thought to Latin America. By the time all desirable holdings had been staled out on other continents, the United States was much too powerful to be pushed aside.

The Monroe Doctrine, when first enunciated, commanded relatively little attention at home and even less respect abroad. It was not even generally known as the Monroe Doctrine until the 1850's. Yet by midcentury the powers were aware that such a policy existed, and that it was backed by a sturdy and growing United States. It is possible---though by no means provable---that there would be somewhat more European territory in the Americas today if the Monroe Doctrine, or some similar doctrine, had not been proclaimed. It became an increasingly potent stick behind the door.